Governance from Islamic economic perspective: A Shari’ah governance framework by Uddin, Md Akther
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Governance from Islamic economic
perspective: A Shari’ah governance
framework
Md Akther Uddin
INCEIF, Malaysia
29. May 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67695/
MPRA Paper No. 67695, posted 9. November 2015 09:29 UTC

 
 
Governance from Islamic Economic Perspective: 
A Shari’ah Governance Framework 
 
Md Akther Uddin 
INCEIF, Malaysia, INCEIF, Malaysia 
 
 
7 November, 2015 
  

Governance from Islamic Economic Perspective: A Shari’ah Governance 
Framework 
Md Akther Uddin1 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper attempts to give a brief overview of existing Shari’ah Governance framework in 
Malaysia, compare with AAOIFI and IFSB standards and guidelines, identify current issues, and 
recommend measures to improve existing practices. The study finds that a great number of research 
have been carried out to study Shari’ah Governance framework in Malaysia, Indonesia, GCC, 
MENA, UK, and other OIC member countries. It can be concluded that the plurality in Shari’ah 
Governance practice across regions and countries may ensure success and support innovation in the 
short run, but, in order to establish credibility and promote Islamic Finance as a comprehensive 
financial system in the long run uniformity is desirable. A sustainable and viable Shari’ah 
Governance framework, which will not only provide credibility to IFIs but also ensure 
transparency, trust, ethical behavior, underlying faith and belief and ethics and  also help protecting 
the stakeholders right and fulfill the broader principle of Maqasid al-Shari’ah (foundational goals of 
the Shari’ah)..  
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Introduction 
Good corporate governance has become a prime issue again among industry practitioners and 
academia since 2008 financial crisis, when corporate fraud, poor governance and manipulation in earnings 
happen to widespread. In a recent award winning Harvard Business Review article, William Lazonick 
criticizes existing Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance (CG) model, which is based on the shareholder’s 
wealth maximization theory, as this instigates many top executives in the U.S. to manipulate earnings, he 
highlights the issue of buying back of shares in order to artificially inflate the share price to gain lucrative 
incentives: bonus and right shares (Lazonick, 2014). Even though this model of corporate governance has 
been highly criticized, Franco-German model of CG has so far failed to find valid logic to include 
stakeholders’ interest in decision making (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2004).  
Islamic finance has shown tremendous potential for the last two decades and it has become a 
formidable and sustainable counterpart of conventional banking system in many Muslim dominated 
countries. At the same time, the importance of Shari’ah Governance (SG) has come up and over the past 
few years, many countries have developed a comprehensive governance framework for Shari’ah issues 
responding to the needs of Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs). However, the absence of well 
conceptualized framework hinders the development of unified, universal, and formalized system. If 
Islamic financial institutions are to be acceptable to their clients, IFIs need to have a formalized system to 
ensure all their activities are Shari’ah compliant (Wilson, 2009; Hassan, 2010; Grassa, 2013).  
Shari’ah Governance 
In order to define Shari’ah Governance, first, we need to define Corporate Governance as they 
exist side by side in Islamic Banks (IBs). The OECD has defined Corporate Governance as the “set of 
relationships between a company’s management, its board, its stakeholders and other stakeholders” 
(OECD, 1999). The dimension of Islamic perspectives of corporate governance has broader horizon and 
cannot compartmentalize the roles and responsibilities in which all actions and obligations fall under the 
jurisdiction of the divine law of Islam, whereas, the OECD principles implements a firm with six different 
issue and obligation (Abu Tapanjeh, 2007; Hassan et al., 2014). Shari’ah governance is a unique 
characteristic of corporate governance in financial architecture and it is concerned with the religious 
aspects and the Islamicity of the activities and conducts of IFIs (Hasan, 2010).   
According to IFSB standard 10, Shari’ah Governance System refers to the set of institutional and 
organizational arrangements through which an IFIs ensures that there is an effective independent oversight 
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of Shari’ah compliance over issuance of relevant Shari’ah pronouncements, dissemination of information, 
an internal and annual Shari’ah compliance review (IFSB, 2009: 2-3) 
The definition above illustrates the extensive duties of Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) to 
oversight and supervises the Shari’ah compliance of the Islamic financial institutions, as such, their 
competence is essential to form a robust Shari’ah board. It also implies that the institution of the Shari’ah 
board is crucial to the Shari’ah governance system as an authoritative body ensuring Shari’ah compliance 
(Haqqi, 2014). 
A Conceptual framework of Shari’ah Governance framework 
Principle 3.1 of the IFSB Guiding Principles on Corporate Governance states that an appropriate 
mechanism must be created to ensure compliance with the Shari’ah principles. The foundational 
dimension of Islamic corporate governance is rooted in the fundamental principles of tawhid (the Oneness 
of Allah), the process of shura (Consulation), property rights and contractual obligations (Travers, 2010). 
While explaining the conceptual framework of corporate governance from Islamic perspective, 
Iqbal & Mirakhor (2004) argues that Shari’ah Governance covers overall governance issues, protection of 
stakeholders rights and compliance with the divine rules guided by Shari’ah, which actually broaden the 
area of governance issue from merely stakeholders model, where scholars have not yet found the logical 
foundation to include various interest groups in corporate  governance model which are indirectly affected 
by corporations’ activities, while Shari’ah governance affirms the inclusion of not only human well-being 
but also surroundings and environment. Moreover, the foundation of stakeholder model is found in 
Islam’s principles of property rights, commitment to explicit and implicit contractual agreements and 
implementation of an effective incentive system (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2004).  
By analyzing stakeholder model of corporate governance from Islamic perspective proposed by 
Iqbal & Mirakhor (2004), Zulkilfi Hasan concludes that little work has been done on corporate 
governance from Islamic economic perspective (Hasan, 2008). It seems logical as Islamic economics had 
been in hibernation for unexpectedly long time and only four decades ago it woke up and has got some 
kind of momentum for the last few decades. 
Existing Shari’ah Governance Practice 
As the importance of Shari’ah Governance is recognized a great number of research has been 
conducted to study Shari’ah Governance framework, existing practice of SG in Islamic Banks and IFIs, 
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contemporary issues and how to improve Shari’ah Governance system in leading Islamic Finance hub like 
in Malaysia, Indonesia, GCC, MENA, UK, and other OIC member countries. 
Ginena (2014) states that (as cited in Alhabashi and Bakar, 2008) variations in sharı‘ah governance 
practices between IFIs in 11 countries to be significantly different; thus, they recommended the 
establishment of a comprehensive Sharı‘ah Governance framework that would promote good governance. 
Corroborating Alhabashi and Bakar’s results, Hasan’s (2011) survey on Shari’ah Governance Practices 
found that operational aspects were significantly different between IFIs with only 39 per cent in Malaysia, 
3 per cent in the UK (UK), and none in the Gulf Cooperative Council reporting having standard Shari’ah 
Governance operating procedures. 
As confirmed earlier, different Shari’ah Governance structures exist in different jurisprudence 
depending on different legal frameworks governing Islamic banks and financial operations and can be 
divided into two broad categories: centralized and decentralized. The countries approaches on SG can 
either be strict, moderate or flexible; Malaysia and Pakistan belong to the first category, characterized by 
the provision of comprehensive guidelines on detailed implementations of SG. Countries like, Bahrain, 
Brunei and the UAE have adopted the moderate approach, providing the main provisions on the process 
but still leaving some aspects to the discretion of institutions or the authorities. On the other hand, 
Singapore and the U.K tend to adopt the flexible approach in this matter whereby most aspects of SG are 
left to the discretion of Islamic banks (Hassan et al., 2014).  Wilson (2009) discusses the merits of 
centralized versus devolved Shari’ah governance and considers what competences and experience 
Shari’ah Board members should have. He mentions the four key attributes identified by the IFSB for 
sound and effective Shari’ah Governance are competence, independence, confidentiality and consistency 
(Wilson, 2009). 
The OECD has issued Guidelines on Corporate Governance, the IOSCO on capital market and the 
BCBS on Basel Committee I, II and III. Nevertheless these standards and guidelines failed to address 
specific issues of Islamic finance (Dusuki, 2011). However, Hassan et al.  (2009) argue that Shari’ah 
Governance structure must be in line with internationally recognized corporate governance standards such 
as those issued by the OECD in order to ensure effective implementation, in addition to that, conserve the 
fulfillment of fiduciary duties that include good faith, care, skill and diligence towards all their 
stakeholders. Moreover, it is necessary to appreciate the comprehensive nature that Shari’ah Governance 
provides to supervise the services of IFIs, the policy makers of a country have to focus on its key 
elements.  
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In the following section, a brief description of Bank Negara Malaysia Shari’ah Governance Framework 
(BNM SGF) 2010 is going to be discussed. 
A Brief Overview BNM SGF 2010 
The Bank Negara Malaysia Shari’ah Governance Framework (SGF 2010) for IFIs was introduced 
by BNM in October 2010, which is expected to solve the basic problems and can be a Shari’ah corporate 
governance model for the rest of the world (Muneeza & Hassan, 2011). The framework works in 
accordance with the Malaysia’s two-tier Shari’ah Governance infrastructure which consists of BNM’s 
central Shari’ah advisory body along with the individual boards, committees or advisories of each 
institution. Hassan et al. (2014) argue that this framework has been introduced at a critical juncture where 
concerns are being voice across the industry regarding the role and function of Shari’ah advisories and 
debating whether, and to what extent, Shari’ah advisory should be regulated.  
The objective of the SGF 2010 is to provide comprehensive guidelines to the board and the 
Shari’ah committee of the IFIs in discharging their responsibilities in relation to Shari’ah matters. It also 
sets out the expectations of BNM on the IFI’s Shari’ah Governance process, structure and arrangement in 
order to ensure that all business activities and operations are Shari’ah compliant. The new scope of this 
framework is the formation of functioning outlines for Shari’ah review, Shari’ah audit, Shari’ah risk 
management and Shari’ah research, which are the four significant functions that provide a system of 
checks and balances within the organization.   
Omar et al. (2014) conducted a survey on 25 Islamic Banks and 12 Takaful Institutions to identify 
the problems and constraints in implementing BNM SGF 2010 in Malaysia and find that Shari’ah 
Governance Framework 2010 is well received by IFIs. They further argue that introduction of Shari’ah 
audit and review function in BNM SGF 2010 has enhanced the institutions product development.  Under 
BNM SGF 2010 any product has to undergo several steps before it is finally approved which helps to 
improve the professional monitoring for Islamic financial products. It is also found in their study that 
Shari’ah non-compliance issue has been reduced after SGF 2010. Interestingly, a common perception 
regarding difficulties of the Board of Directors in making decisions due to Shari’ah Committee resolution 
has been found not correct. However, difficulty in getting qualified Shari’ah officer is acknowledged by 
the industry practitioners and they further explain that this may be due to difficulty in finding a person 
who is well versed both in Shari’ah and modern financial transaction. 
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Comparative Analysis of Shari’ah Governance Framework 
In order to have a clear idea about differences in Shari’ah Governance practice across the region 
and countries, a comparative analysis is used in this section. Kasim et al. (2013) compare AAOIFI, IFSB 
and BNM Shari’ah Governance guidelines and argue that all the guidelines discuss and emphasize on 
independence, competence, responsibility, accountability, confidentiality of Shari’ah board members, 
also, the importance of Shari’ah review and audit functions is highlighted in all the guidelines although 
AAOIFI discuss in more detail, Shari’ah risk management and research function have been discussed only 
in BNM Shari’ah Governance framework (Kasim et al., 2013). The difference between the IFSB 
Prudential Standards and the AAOIFI Governance Standards is that the IFSB approach is more concerned 
towards regulators while the AAOIFI, to individual IFIs (Dusuki, 2011). Shari’ah Governance framework 
provided by AAOIFI has seven sections, the framework of IFSB includes scope and approach of SG 
system and the qualitative characteristics of Shari’ah Supervisory Committee, at the same time, BNM 
provides the general requirements of the framework, qualitative characteristics and provide the  guidelines 
on Shari’ah review and Shari’ah audit, in addition to that, BNM provides the guideline on the functions of 
Shari’ah risk management and Shari’ah research in Islamic Finance (Kasim et al., 2013). As Shari’ah 
Governance is new, they propose that respective regulators should implement the prescriptive approach 
like the first approach taken by the U.K while implementing the corporate governance code. They 
conclude by suggesting standardized and comprehensive guideline or framework for easy reference for 
industry practitioners, regulators, Shari’ah advisors and investors.  
Table 1  
Comparative analysis among Shari’ah Governance guidelines 
No Discussion AAOIFI* IFSB† BNM¥ 
1. Definition of shari’ah governance Not provided Provided Not provided 
2. Independence, competence, 
responsibility of Shari’ah 
Supervisory Board 
Discussed Discussed Discussed 
3. Shari’ah review and Shari’ah audit Discussed  Discussed Discussed 
4. Risk Management Not discussed Not discussed  Discussed 
5.  Research function Not discussed Not discussed Discussed 
*Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions AAOIFI 
† Islamic Financial Services Board and ¥ Bank Negara Malaysia Shari’ah Governance Framework 2010 
 
Note: From Kasim et al. (2013). Comparative Analysis on AAOIFI, IFSB and BNM Shari’ah Governance. 
International Journal of Business and Social Science. 4(15), p. 226 
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Current issues in Shari’ah Governance 
In a recent working paper, Shamsher et al. (2015) state that in addition to shareholders right 
protection, IFIs must also protect interests of all stakeholders and ensure justice. They further argue that to 
do so IFIs would face challenges in the real markets that could adversely affect its effectiveness in 
mitigating Shari’ah risk and identify such issues as degree of independence of Shari’ah committee, 
confidentiality, competence, consistency, and information disclosure (Shamsher et al., 2015; Wilson, 
2012; ).  
Hasan (2014) finds that there are gaps and shortcomings in the existing Shari’ah Governance 
practices of IFIs, particularly the aspects of the general approach to SG, the internal SG framework, the 
attributes of the Shari’ah board in terms of mechanisms of competence, independence and transparency 
and confidentiality, operational procedures and Shari’ah board’s assessment. He also finds that regulatory 
framework has positive influence on Shari’ah scholars’ views towards Shari’ ah governance.It was also 
found that lack of responsibility, accountability and independence in decision making, as corporate 
governance principles, is contributing to the ineffectiveness of current practices in the investigated IFIs 
(Magalhaes & Al-Saad, 2013). 
Investment account holders right in Islamic banks has been widely discussed and debated. Wilson 
(2012:213) argues that investment account holders have a much greater stake in an Islamic bank than 
depositors with a conventional bank as they share in its profits rather than being paid interest. It is 
appropriate therefore that there should be more direct corporate responsibility to investment-account 
holders in an Islamic bank which will be reflected in the corporate governance structure. Magalhaes & Al-
Saad (2013) confirm that that the current practices implemented by IFIs in protecting the rights of 
Unrestricted Investment Account Holders are not effective enough, in the light of standard corporate 
governance principles. Wilson (2012) further argues that as the mudaraba account holders are not the 
owners of the Islamic banks, as a result, they cannot benefit from ownership rights. By comparing 
responsibility of Islamic banks to unrestricted and restricted investment-account holder, he concludes that 
restricted-investment depositors cannot be regarded as stakeholders in the Islamic bank.  
Recommendation to Improve Shari’ah Governance Practice 
Grassa (2013) argue that even if Southeast Asian model of Shari’ah supervision seems to be most 
efficient and effective in achieving the Shari’ah compliant purpose than the GCC model, it cannot be 
considered as a perfect model. A lot of works are required to improve it (Grassa, 2013). Hassan et al. 
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(2014) recommend the following mechanisms in order to ensure a sound Shari’ah Governance system: a) 
a Shari’ah board with qualified members; b) a well-defined and adequately qualified and staffed 
organizational structure; c) clear lines of authority and accountability; d) policies and procedures 
pertaining to the approval of products and activities that require adherence to Shari’ah rules and 
principles; and e) an independent and regular review of Shari’ah compliance (Hassan et al., 2014). 
Muneeza & Hassan (2014) argue that IFIs need sound “Shari’ah Governance Code” based on the 
principle of Islamic Law in addition to good governance rules like their conventional counterpart.  
While analyzing four key attributes identified by IFSB: competence, independence, confidentiality 
and consistency Wilson (2009) recommends followings to improve Shari’ah Governance practice: 
professional development with modern finance and contemporary legal contract (Ghayad, 2008), 
renewable contract with Shari’ah board members, compensation of Shari’ah board members by the 
government but not idealistic for all countries,  consistency between IFIs within a single jurisdiction,  and 
coordination between AAOIFI, OIC Fiqh Academy, IFSB. Moreover, clear organizational charts, showing 
the remit and accountability of different stakeholder groups would help explaining role and workings of 
Shari’ah boards. In addition, scholars from economics, finance, law and political science should be 
included in Shari’ah board as practised in Sudan in order for making well-informed decisions, while there 
exist arguments for and against this as well.   
A framework including structures and processes internal and external to the IIFS can be expected 
to enhance public understanding of the requirements of Shari’ah. It would be conducive to the 
development of market discipline as it would permit an effective utilization of exit and participatory 
actions (Grais & Pellegrini, 2006). 
Conclusion 
In the recent past Shari’ah Governance has got a considerable attention from not only academia 
but also from Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs). Consequently, a great of number of research has been 
carried out in countries where Islamic Finance (IF) has been playing a significant role in economy or 
where it has just started to emerge. The study indicates that the plurality in Shari’ah Governance practice 
across regions and countries may promote innovation but in order to establish credibility and promote 
Islamic Finance as a comprehensive financial system uniformity is desirable. Against a backdrop of global 
financial crisis in 2007-2008, the issue has even become more vital for IFIs to uphold its uniqueness, 
sustainability, credibility and transparency in doing business for its Muslim as well as non-Muslim 
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stakeholders. In order to develop a comprehensive governance system it is necessary to ensure active 
involvement of Shari’ah scholars with industry practitioners and regulators. A sustainable and viable 
Shari’ah Governance framework, which will not only provide credibility to IFIs but also ensure 
transparency, trust, ethical behavior, credibility, underlying faith and belief and ethics (Thomas et al., 
2005 cited in Nathan & Ribieri, 2007)  and  also help protecting the stakeholders right and fulfill the 
broader principle of Maqasid al-Shari’ah (foundational goals of the Shari’ah).
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